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This paper analyses consumption patterns of vice -- marijuana, tobacco and alcohol.  To 
deal with imperfect marijuana data, we exploit the interdependencies in the consumption of the 
three drugs identified in prior research, and introduce a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to 
formally account for the inherent uncertainty in marijuana-related data and parameters.  To 
illustrate the application of the framework, we use Australian data to simulate the impact on the 
consumption of vice of a reduction in the price of marijuana; changes in pre-existing taxes on 
tobacco and alcohol; legalisation of marijuana, which is then subject to taxation; and a tax tradeoff 
involving the introduction of a revenue-neutral tax on marijuana that is offset by reduced alcohol 
taxation.  The revenue-maximising tax rate for marijuana of about 50% is estimated to yield 
additional revenue of about 15% of the pre-existing proceeds from vice taxation.  The role of 
uncertainty surrounding marijuana is highlighted by providing the entire probability distributions of 
all endogenous variables in a consistent multivariate framework.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper deals with the determinants of consumption of a good that, officially at least, 
does not exist -- marijuana.  Despite the denial of its existence by officialdom, estimates indicate 
that the consumption of marijuana is quite substantial in many countries.  In Australia, for instance, 
more than one in three people say they have tried marijuana, and Clements and Daryal (2005) 
estimate that its sales are something like twice those of wine.  More generally, illicit drug use is part 
of the underground economy and a number of studies using a variety of approaches have 
investigated the order of magnitude of this sector (see, e. g., Bajada, 1999).  The widespread use of 
marijuana, its unique tax-free status, the current interest in its decriminalisation/legalisation and the 
size of the underground economy all make research on the economics of marijuana consumption a 
worthwhile endeavor. 
Empirical studies show that marijuana is closely related in consumption to at least two other 
goods, tobacco and alcohol.
1  As in many instances marijuana is mixed with tobacco and then 
smoked, there is a presumption that these goods are complements.  Furthermore, as marijuana and 
alcoholic beverages contain intoxicating properties that are similar in the minds of many 
consumers, they both tend to serve the same want, and it is reasonable to suppose that they are 
substitutes. These considerations imply that the consumption of the three goods, which we dub the 
demand for vice, needs to be modeled jointly as an interrelated system of demand equations.  Such 
interrelations imply cross-commodity impacts of any policy changes, so that changes in one drug 
market are likely to have spillover effects in related markets.  For example, what would be the 
likely impacts on the markets for tobacco and alcohol, as well as the revenue from taxing these 
products, if there were further decriminalisation of marijuana?  What is the potential tax revenue 
from marijuana were it legalised? And how would changes in taxation and regulation arrangements 
for alcohol and tobacco impact on marijuana consumption?   
Answers to these questions depend crucially on unofficial estimates of the price and quantity 
data for marijuana, as well as a consistent set of own- and cross-price elasticities characterising the 
interrelationships in consumption of vice.  The problem in constructing such a demand system is 
that hard data on marijuana consumption are just not available; even the data on alcohol and 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cameron and Williams (2001), Clements and Daryal (2005), Saffer and Chaloupka (1995), and 
Zhao and Harris (2004).   2
tobacco consumption are not perfect as, due to the typically high excise taxes that these goods bear, 
there are substantial incentives to underreport, or not report at all, to avoid the tax net.
2  This is an 
extreme example of the situation faced in modeling exercises such as equilibrium displacement 
modeling (EDM) (see, e.g., Zhao et al., 2000) and computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling 
(see, e.g., Dixon and Rimmer, 2002), where a large number of base market values and preference 
elasticities need to be specified. 
Even if CGE modelers do not have the required number of high-quality econometric 
estimates to draw upon for the basis of their elasticities, they typically do have substantial 
information on consumption and prices to derive base market values.  As mentioned above, such is 
not the case for marijuana, and we have to rely on unofficial data that are surely subject to more 
than the usual questions about their quality.  In this paper, we introduce a simulation procedure in 
the context of a demand system for vice -- marijuana, tobacco and alcohol -- to formally account for 
the inherent uncertainty in the marijuana-related data and demand elasticities.  We use separability 
theory as a basis for organising the fragmentary information that is available on marijuana 
consumption, and then combine that with econometric estimates and data pertaining to tobacco and 
alcohol.  We then use stochastic simulations as a way to formally recognise the substantial 
uncertainties inherent in all aspects of the consumption of marijuana, as well as those associated 
with tobacco and alcohol.  Zhao et al. (2000) and Griffiths and Zhao (2000) have used a similar 
approach in the context of sensitivity analysis for an EDM of the Australian wool industry.  We 
extend that approach by simulating the implied distributions of demand elasticities through 
quantification of uncertainty in fundamental preference parameters within a complete demand 
specification, and by also allowing for uncertainty in marijuana-related data.  These procedures may 
be of general interest, and have applications in EDM and CGE modeling and other areas of applied 
economics.  To illustrate the approach, we simulate the cross-commodity impacts of some 
hypothetical price and tax changes. 
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section specifies a demand system for vice 
using the analytical framework of the differential approach to consumption economics; this 
approach highlights the links between preferences and observable consumption behaviour within a 
general setting.  Section 3 introduces a set of baseline budget shares using Australia data and 
                                                 
2 The situation in Russia provides an illuminating example. The Economist (September 13, 2003, p. 66) describes it as 
follows: “The figures prove what everyone knows: Russians drink like mad. In 2001, alcohol overdoses killed 139 
people in England and Wales, but more than 40,000 Russians, in a population less than three times the size. But other 
official figures indicate quite the opposite: the average Briton consumed the equivalent of 8.4 litres of pure alcohol in 
2001, the average Russian swallowed a mere 8.1 litres. Why the discrepancy? A mix of understated production by 
Russian distillers and the Russian taste for industrial alcohol or toxic moonshine could be one explanation.”   3
fundamental consumer preference parameters for the demand system, from which Frisch, Slutsky 
and Marshallian price elasticities and income elasticities are derived. Section 4 introduces 
uncertainty by specifying subjective probability distributions for the basic preference parameters, 
allowing for varying degrees of preference structure and deriving the implied probability 
distributions through Monte Carlo simulation for the demand elasticities.  To illustrate the 
approach, in Section 5 we simulate the impacts on the consumption of vice and tax revenue of a 
reduction in the price of marijuana, possibly resulting from productivity enhancement in its 
cultivation and/or lighter regulation, and changes in tobacco and alcohol taxation.  We also simulate 
a scenario of legalising and taxing marijuana, deriving the revenue-maximising marijuana tax and 
providing results on a tax-neutrality tradeoff between marijuana and alcohol taxes. Throughout the 
analysis the role of uncertainty surrounding preference interactions within vice, as well as the 
uncertainties regarding data pertaining to the consumption of marijuana, is highlighted by providing 
the whole probability distributions of all endogenous variables in a consistent multivariate 
framework.  Section 6 contains concluding comments. 
 
2.  A DEMAND SYSTEM FOR VICE 
 
This section sets out the analytical framework for the analysis of demand for vice within a 
complete demand system of four goods of marijuana, tobacco, alcohol and ‘other’.  We use Theil’s 
(1980) differential approach to consumption theory due to its generality and elegant simplicity, as 
well as its transparent link between the structure of preferences and the nature of the demand 
equations. 
Let   i p   be the price of good i (i = 1, …, n) and qi the corresponding quantity demanded.  
Then 
n
ii i1 Mp q = =∑  is total expenditure on the n goods (“income” for short) and  ii i wp q / M =  is 
the share of income devoted to good i, also known as the budget share of  i.  Furthermore, let 
n
ii i1 d(logQ) w d(logq) = = ∑  be the Divisia volume index representing relative change in the 
consumer’s real income. It follows from the budget constraint that 
n
ii i1 d(logQ) d(logM) w d(logp ) = =− ∑ , so that the change in real income is the change in money 
income deflated by  the Divisia price index 
n
ii i1 wd ( l o g p) = ∑ . Under standard assumptions, we can 
express the demand equation for good i in differential form (Theil, 1980) as 
(2.1)        
n
ii i i j j
j1
w d(logq ) d(logQ) d(logp ) d(log P )
=
′ ⎡ ⎤ =θ + ν − ⎣ ⎦ ∑ .   4
In equation (2.1), the parameter  ii i (p q )/ M θ= ∂ ∂   is the marginal share of good i, which answers 
the question “if income rises by one dollar what proportion of this increase is spent on good i?”.  It 
follows from the budget constraint that 
n
i i1 1 = θ = ∑ . The term 
ij
ij i j (p p / M ) u ν=λ  is the (i, j)
th Frisch 
price coefficient, where 
ij u  is the (i, j)
th element of 
1 − U  with 
2u/ ′ = ∂∂ ∂ Uq q  being the Hessian of 
the utility function u(q) and  [ ] i q q = , the quantity vector. Finally, 
n
ii i1 d(logP) d(logp) = ′ =θ ∑  is 
the Frisch price index, which uses as weights marginal shares, rather than budget shares as in the 
Divisia price index.  If we divide both sides of equation (2.1) by wi, we find that  iii /w η= θ  is the 
income elasticity of demand for good i, while  ij ij i
* /w η= ν  is the (i, j)
th  Frisch price elasticity, 
which measures the effect of a Frisch-deflated (or relative) price change in the j
th good on the 
consumption of the i
th good holding real income constant.  
Define  ij ⎡⎤ ν ⎣⎦ ν=  as the matrix of Frisch coefficients. For a budget-constrained utility 
maximum, ν is negative definite. Another property of ν is that its row sums are proportional to the 
corresponding marginal shares, 






ν= φ θ = ∑ . 







φ= < ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 is the reciprocal of the income elasticity of the 
marginal utility of income, known as the “income flexibility” for short, where λ is the marginal 
utility of income. It can also be shown that  ( ) d(log ) 1 d(logQ) d(logP') λ= φ − . Using this 
relationship and (2.2), the Frisch demand equation (2.1) can alternatively be written in terms of the 
marginal utility of income as  
   ()
nn
ii i i j ji j j
j1 j1
w d(logq ) d(log ) d(logp ) d(logp ) d log
==
⎡ ⎤ =θφ λ + ν = ν − λ ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑ , 
where the last step follows from (2.2). It can be seen from the above that the Frisch price elasticity 
ij ij i
* /w η= ν  is also interpreted as the effect of a change in the price of good j on the consumption of 
good i holding the marginal utility of income constant. Following Houthakker (1960), goods i and j 
are called specific substitutes or complements according to the sign of the Frisch price elasticity  ij
* η .  
As demand equation (2.1) is formulated in terms of deflated prices, the substitution term of 
that equation contains the 
th j  price twice, once explicitly and once within the Frisch price index. 
We use equation (2.2) to combine these by rewriting (2.1) as    5
(2.3)                                ( )
n
ii i i j j
j1
wd ( l o gq) d ( l o gQ ) d l o gp ,
=
∑ =θ + π  
where  ij ij i j π= ν− φ θθ is the ()
th i, j  Slutsky price coefficient. The symmetry and homogeneity 
conditions imply that  ij ji π= π and 
n
ij j1 0
= π = ∑ . The Slutsky coefficient, and the corresponding 
elasticity  ij ij i w η= π , deal with the impact on the consumption of good i of a change in the price of 
j on account of the total substitution effect, real income remaining unchanged. Goods are called 
Slutsky (or Hicksian)  substitutes or complements according to the sign of the Slutsky price 
elasticity. Finally, if alternatively we hold money income constant, the Marshallian price effects can 
be shown by substituting 
n
ii i1 d(logQ) d(logM) w d(logp ) = =− ∑  in (2.3) to obtain 
                                   ( )
n
ii i i j j
j1
w d(logq ) d(logM) d logp ,
=
∑ =θ + γ   
where  ij ij i j w γ= π− θ  is the Marshallian price coefficient. The corresponding Marshallian (or 
uncompensated)  elasticity,  ij ij i j w ′ η= η− η , gives the percentage change in the consumption of i 
following a one-percent change in the price of j, holding money income constant. 
As the Frisch price coefficients deal with the specific substitution effects that directly relate 
to the interaction of goods in the utility function, these coefficients offer a convenient way to 
introduce prior notions of the likely structure of preferences. An example is the case of preference 
independence (PI) whereby goods do not interact with each other, such that utility is additive in the 
n goods,
n
1n i i i1 u(q ,...,q ) u (q ) = =∑ , with  ii u( q)  a sub-utility function that depends only on the 
consumption of good i. In this case,  ii i u/ q du /dq ∂ ∂= , so all second-order cross derivatives 
vanish and both the Hessian U  and its inverse 
1 − U  are diagonal. PI thus implies that all Frisch 
price coefficients  ij ν  for ij ≠  are zero and from equation (2.2),  ii i ν =φθ. Accordingly, under PI, 
demand equation (2.1) simplifies to 
                  ii i i i w d(logq ) d(logQ) d(logp ) d(logP ) ′ =θ +φθ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ , 
so that all cross-price Frisch elasticities,  ij ij i
* /w η= ν  for ij ≠ , are zero. Further implications of PI 
are that (i) Frisch own-price elasticities are proportional to the corresponding income elasticities; 
and (ii) inferior goods are ruled out. These implications of PI are restrictive and clearly the 
hypothesis will not hold in all circumstances.    6
3.  SPECIFICATION OF BASELINE DATA AND DEMAND PARAMETERS  
 
In this section, we proceed to specify a set of baseline budget shares and fundamental 
consumer preference parameters for the demand system specified in the previous section. Income 
and price elasticities are then derived so that the model can be used to simulate the effects of any 
exogenous changes on interrelated vice markets in an internally-consistent manner. 
Budget Shares, Income Elasticities, Marginal Shares and Income Flexibility 
Column 2 of Table 1 gives the baseline budget shares of the four goods based on household 
expenditures in Australia in the late 1990’s. The total household expenditure and expenditures on 
tobacco and alcohol are based on the Australian Household Expenditure Surveys. The marijuana 
quantity data are estimated from information on frequency of consumption based on a large-scale 
national representative survey together with assumptions regarding intensity of use, while the 
marijuana price data are based on information supplied by the Australian Bureau of Criminal 
Intelligence (see Clements et al., 2005, for details). These data are subject to more than the usual 
degree of uncertainty, a feature that will be taken into account in the analysis in the next section.  
Column 3 of Table 1 specifies that the income elasticity of marijuana is 1.2, making it a 
modest luxury; that of tobacco is 0.4, a necessity; and alcohol is 1.0, a borderline case. The basis for 
the choice of these values is as follows. As there are few, if any, reliable published estimates of  i η  
for marijuana, there is clearly not much to go on other than the similarities between this good and 
alcohol. Accordingly, there is some presumption that consumers regard the luxuriousness of these 
two goods to be similar. As discussed below, we use  i 1 η =  for alcohol, but we have a mild 
preference to regard marijuana as having a slightly higher  i η  . It must be emphasised, however, that 
due to the absence of hard evidence, we cannot have too much confidence in the precision of this 
estimate. In contrast to marijuana, there have been a large number of studies published on tobacco 
demand; for reviews of the literature, see Cameron (1998) and Chaloupka and Warner (2000). A 
recent meta-analysis of 86 different studies of tobacco consumption by Gallet and List (2003) 
reports a mean income elasticity of 0.42 and a standard deviation of 0.43. We thus set  i 0.4 η=  for 
tobacco, and keep in mind the uncertainties. 
The good “alcohol” comprises beer, wine and spirits as a group. Prior studies almost 
invariably find the income elasticity for beer to be less than one, and not infrequently of the order of 
0.5, making this beverage a necessity. As wine and spirits are more luxurious than beer, estimates   7
of their  i η  tend to be substantially above one.
3 With these considerations in mind, we shall use a 
budget-share-weighted average  to estimate the income elasticity for alcohol, with the income 
elasticity for beer being 0.5 and 1.5 for both wine and spirits.  Based on data from the Australian 
Household Expenditure Surveys, we use 0.50, 0.25 and 0.25 for the shares for beer, wine and 
spirits, respectively, to obtain the income elasticity for alcohol as a whole of 1, which agrees well 
with direct estimates of this elasticity obtained for Australia by Clements and Johnson (1983) and 
Clements and Selvanathan (1991).
4 On this basis, we set the  i η  for the aggregated good alcohol 
equal to 1. Finally, the  i η  for the remaining good “other” can be obtained using Engel aggregation 
4
ii i1 w1 = η= ∑ , which implies its income elasticity is 1.0087. The marginal shares of the four 
commodities are computed as  ii i w θ= η, and these values are given in column 4 of Table 1.  
The final coefficient to be considered is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income, 
which, in reciprocal form, is the income flexibility φ . The value of the income flexibility φ is 
specified as -0.5, which is based on the following prior findings. Selvanathan (1993) uses time-
series data to estimate a differential demand system for each of 15 OECD countries. For Australia, 
the  φ-estimate is –0.46 , with asymptotic standard error (ASE) 0.08 (Selvanathan, 1993, p. 189). 
When the data are pooled over the 15 countries, the estimate of φ is –0.45, with ASE 0.02 
(Selvanathan, 1993, p. 198). Using a related approach, Selvanathan (1993, Sec. 6.4) obtains 322 
estimates of φ, one for each year in the sample period for each of 18 OECD countries; the weighted 
mean of these estimates is very similar to those above at –0.46 (ASE = 0.03). Two other cross-
country estimates of φ are also relevant. Using the data for 30 countries, Theil (1987, Sec. 2.8) 
obtains an estimate of φ of –0.53 (0.04). Chen (1999, p. 171) estimates a demand system for 42 
countries and obtains an estimate of φ of –0.42 (0.05), when there are intercepts in his differential 
demand equations, which play the role of residual trends in consumption, and –0.29 (0.05) when 
there are no such intercepts. The final element of support for using  0.5 φ =−  is the earlier, but still 
influential, survey by Brown and Deaton (1972, p. 1206) who review previous findings and 
                                                 
3 For a brief review of prior studies, see Clements and Selvanathan (1991).  More recently, Selvanathan and 
Selvanathan (2005, p. 232, 237) use time-series data for 10 countries to estimate conditional income elasticities for the 
three alcoholic beverages. Averaging over countries, they obtain 0.75 for beer, 1.1 for wine and 1.42 for spirits, or using 
a somewhat different approach 0.75, 0.98 and 1.39 (in the same order).  In view of sampling variability, these values are 
unlikely to be significantly different to those described in the text. 
4 For details, see Clements et al. (2005).  It should also be noted that a unity income elasticity for alcohol agrees with 
the evidence of Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005, p. 195) who estimate this elasticity for 40 countries with time-
series data.  The average of these 40 estimates is 1.04.  Using a somewhat different approach, the mean of another 40 
estimates is 0.96 (Selvanathan and Selvanathan, 2005, p. 207).   8
conclude that “there would seem to be fair agreement on the use of a value for φ around minus one 
half”. Taken as a whole, it thus seems not unreasonable to use a φ-value of –0.5. 
Vice Interactions and Price Elasticities 
Prior empirical evidence clearly indicates that marijuana, tobacco and alcohol are closely 
related in consumption. Using unit record data from a large-scale Australian survey (National Drug 
Household Survey, NDSHS, 2001), Zhao and Harris (2004) report significant correlation in 
individuals’ participation across the three goods. While micro-level demand studies often suffer 
from a lack of continuous consumption quantity data and individual level prices, overall, the 
available studies in Australia seem to point to a complementary relationship between marijuana and 
tobacco, and substitutability between marijuana and alcohol. Using the NDSHS data between 1988 
and 1995, Cameron and Williams (2001) find that tobacco is a complement for marijuana, and 
marijuana is a substitute for alcohol. Using a trivariate approach and the NDSHS data between 1995 
and 2001, Zhao and Harris (2004) find a similar pattern, although the substitutability relationship 
between marijuana and alcohol is insignificant. One other Australian study is also worth 
mentioning. Clements and Daryal (2005) use aggregate time-series data on marijuana consumption 
derived from the micro information from the NDSHS on individuals’ consumption frequencies, 
together with published data on the consumption of three alcohol beverages of beer, wine and 
spirits. Making a rough adjustment to hold income constant, they analyse the correlations between 
the consumption of the four goods, and find some evidence indicating that marijuana is a substitute 
for each of the three alcoholic beverages.
5 
Four other studies deal with the interrelationship in consumption of tobacco and alcohol 
using UK or US data (Goel and Morey, 1995, Jones, 1989, Decker and Schwartz, 2000, and Duffy, 
1991). The results are mixed in relation to the sign of the cross-price effect. In a review of the US 
literature on the interactions within vice, Cameron and Williams (2001) point out that US studies do 
not typically use marijuana prices due to their unavailability, and instead use proxies such as 
whether or not a state has decriminalised the use of marijuana. Cameron and Williams note that on 
the basis of two prior US studies (Chaloupka et al., 1999, and Farrelly et al., 1999), the evidence 
can probably be interpreted as saying that marijuana and tobacco are complements. Another finding 
                                                 
5 Clements and Daryal (2005) also estimate a differential demand model for marijuana, beer, wine and spirits, with 
preference independence imposed (to keep things manageable).  As this rules out complementarity, their estimates are 
not able to shed any light on the issue of substitutes versus complements.    9
to emerge from their survey is that the US evidence regarding the relationship between marijuana 
and alcohol is mixed, with some studies finding them to be substitutes and others complements.
6 
While not completely clear cut, prior findings regarding vice interactions can be summarised 
as follows. Marijuana and tobacco are in all probability complements. While there is no consensus 
regarding the interactions involving alcohol, there seems to be more evidence suggesting it to be a 
substitute for marijuana and tobacco. In what follows, we model demand interactions across drugs 
via the pattern of the Frisch price coefficients  ij ν . To organise the discussion, we start with the 
restrictive case of preference independence and then move to a more flexible structure that allows 
for specific substitutability/complementarity relationships. These preference structures are then 
translated into sets of price elasticities that are consistent with prior evidence summarised above.  
First-Pass on the Price Elasticities: Preference Independence 
As a starting point, we shall assume that the four goods are preference independent (PI) in 
the consumer’s utility function so that  ij 0 (i j) ν =≠  and there is no specific substitution across 
goods. Using the data in Table 1, Table 2 presents the Frisch, Slutsky and Marshallian price 
elasticities under PI. Several comments can be made. First, for each element of vice the three 
versions of the own-price elasticities are quite similar, as can be seen by the following: 
  Frisch  ii
* η  Slutsky ii η  Marshallian ii ′ η  
Marijuana -.60  -.59  -.61 
Tobacco -.20  -.20  -.21 
Alcohol -.50  -.48  -.52  . 
Second, due to the substantial income effect, the three values of the own-price elasticity for other 
*
44 44 44 ( 0.50, 0.04 and 0.96) η= − η= − η= − ′  differ considerably. Third, the cross-price elasticities 
involving vice are all quite small, which is due to (i) the assumption of preference independence 
and (ii) the small budget shares of these goods. Finally, under PI, all four goods are Slutsky 
substitutes and Marshallian complements.  
                                                 
6 For an extended discussion of the prior literature, see Clements et al. (2005).   10
Second-Pass Price Elasticities: Preference Dependence 
Under preference independence, the 4 × 4 matrix of price coefficients ν has the following 
structure: 
 










⎢⎥ φθφ θ ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ φθφ θ
⎢⎥ φθφ θ ⎣⎦
 
We now generalise this structure by allowing marijuana and tobacco to be specific complements, so 
that  12 ν  becomes negative. We thus now specify  12 0 ν =α<  , but additionally in view of the 
symmetry of ν and the row-sum constraints (2.2), the values of many of the other previously 
nonzero elements of the matrix must change. In what follows, we discuss in turn each of the four 
rows of ν . 
The Marijuana Row: The elements of the first row of ν,  11 12 13 14 ,,, ν ννν , refer to the 
responsiveness of marijuana consumption to changes in the four relative prices. Under (i) PI and (ii) 









φθ α −α φθ
 
 
For PD, we have enforced the row-sum constraint by setting  13 ν =−α and leaving  11 14 and νν  
unchanged. This means that marijuana and alcohol are specified to be specific substitutes, while 
marijuana and other continue to be independent, which is reasonable considering the aggregated 
nature of the fourth good. 
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As  ν is a symmetric matrix,  21 12 ν= ν, which implies that under PD  21 ν =α. In other words, if 
marijuana and tobacco are specific substitutes, so also are tobacco and marijuana. We use the same 
approach as above in dealing with the row-sum constraint by setting  13 ν =− α, so that tobacco and 
alcohol are specific substitutes. As again we have no strong priors, we take tobacco and other to be 
independent. 
The Alcohol Row: The third row of ν is 
 







−α −α φθ + α φθ
 
Under PD, the elements  31 ν  and  32 ν  are both equal to −α due to symmetry. As before, we take 
alcohol and other to be independent, so that  34 0 ν =  . The constraint on the sum of the elements in 
the alcohol row under PD then implies that  33 3 2 ν =φθ + α . 







000   
φθφ θ
φθφ θ
     
By symmetry, the first three elements of this row are determined by the last elements in each of the 
first three rows. Accordingly, these elements are all zero under PI and PD, so that the row for other 
is the same under the two specifications. 










φθ α −α φθ ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ αφ θ − α φ θ ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ −α −α φθ + α φθ
⎢⎥ φθφ θ ⎣⎦
 
This matrix is symmetric and satisfies the row-sum constraints, as required. What value should the 
negative parameter α take? A rise in the tobacco price reduces consumption of tobacco and as 
marijuana and tobacco are complements, it also reduces marijuana consumption. Similarly, a rise in 
marijuana prices causes the consumption of both marijuana and tobacco to fall. As the parameter α 
represents the degree of complementarity between marijuana and tobacco, it would seem not 
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.   12
unreasonable for α to be the higher (in absolute value), the higher is the own-price responsiveness 
of both marijuana and tobacco, as measured by  12 and φθφ θ . One way to implement this idea is to 
take  α to be some proportion of the mean of  12 and φθφ θ , so that if we use the geometric mean, 
we have 
(3.2)                 12 ,1 0 α=ρ φ θ θ − <ρ< . 
Writing 
ij ν  for the ()
th i, j  element of 
−1 ν , it can be shown that 
12 11 22 −ρ≈ν ν ν , so that ρ is 
approximately the correlation measuring the degree of complementarity between marijuana and 
tobacco (see Clements et al., 2005, for further details). 
As it is difficult to have a strong prior idea of the precise degree of complementarity, and 
since  10 − <ρ< , we shall focus on the case in which  0.5 ρ =− , a value mid-way between the two 
extremes. Using the data given in Table 1, Table 3 contains the price elasticities corresponding to 
0.5 ρ=− , and as can be seen, the cross elasticities involving vice are now larger in absolute value 
than those of Table 2. Next, in Figure 1 we explore the implication of differing values of ρ for the 
three versions of the elasticity of demand for marijuana with respect to the price of tobacco. The 
Frisch elasticity takes the form  12 12 1 1 2 1
* ww η= ν = ρ φ θ θ . If we invert the scales on both the 
vertical and horizontal axes, the plot of this elasticity against ρ is a ray coming out of the origin, as 
can be seen from Figure 1. The corresponding Slutsky elasticity is  12 12 1 2 1
* w η= η− φ θ θ , the plot 
of which is parallel to Frisch, with vertical intercept equal to the general substitution effect 
12 1 /w 0.5 0.024 0.008/0.02 0.0048 −φ θ θ = × × = , which is very small. Finally, the Marshallian 
elasticity is  12 12 1 2 w ′ η= η− η , which differs from Slutsky by the income effect of the price change, 
12 w 1.2 0.02 0.024 −η =− × =− , and is thus the “top” curve in the figure. The main message from the 




                                                 
7 For an analysis of the impact of ρ on the other price elasticities, see Clements et al. (2005).   13
4.     STOCHASTIC VICE: PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR DEMAND ELASTICITIES 
 
The above price elasticities are consistent with what is known about the demand for vice.  
As that knowledge is highly imperfect, in this section we introduce a simulation approach to 
formally quantify the uncertainty regarding the structure of preferences. The approach involves 
describing uncertainty with subjective probability distributions of the budget shares and the   
demand parameters, based on the available prior information such as economic theory, published 
econometric estimates, and our subjective judgment. The implied probability distributions for the 
elasticities, which are non-linear functions of the budget shares and parameters, are then obtained 
through Monte Carlo simulation. These uncertainties in both the data and preference parameters can 
then be translated to probability statements regarding the own- and cross-industry impacts in policy 
analysis. An advantage of the approach is that inequality constraints required by economic theory or 
subjective beliefs can be imposed easily through simulation.
8  
The basic ingredients for the simulation are the four budget and marginal shares ( i w  and 
i θ ), the income flexibility (φ) and the correlation ρ. Each of these follows a truncated normal 
distribution with the mode (which is equivalent to the mean before truncation) given by the base 
values specified in Section 3 and a specified standard deviation. Regarding the budget shares, for 
marijuana the mean of the distribution is 2% and we shall take the 95% confidence interval to be 1-
3%, which, on the basis of normality, implies a standard deviation of 0.5% and coefficient of 
variation of 0.5 2= 25%. Furthermore, we restrict the range of this share by a truncation of the 
normal distribution such that  1 0w 1 << . This information is contained in the first row of Table 4. 
For tobacco and alcohol, as consumption of these products is legal, it is reasonable to suppose that 
there is less uncertainty about their budget shares and we take their coefficients of variation to be 
12.5%, one half that of marijuana, as indicated in rows 2 and 3 of column 4 in Table 4. We also 
restrict these shares to the (0, 1) interval. As 
4
i i1w1 = = ∑ , all the information on the distribution of 
the budget share of the fourth good, other, can be derived from those pertaining to the first three, 
and is recorded in row 4 of Table 4.   
Due to the “unobservable” nature of the marginal shares, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
their values are more uncertain than those of the budget shares. The coefficient of variation of  i θ  
                                                 
8 Subjective probability distributions and the simulation techniques described above are typically used in modern 
Bayesian analysis (see, for example, Geweke, 1999). For examples of a similar approach in the context of equilibrium 
displacement models, see Griffiths and Zhao (2000) and Zhao et al. (2000). 
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for marijuana is taken to be 50%, while that for tobacco and alcohol is taken to be 25%. Here again 
we employ the rule that marijuana is twice as uncertain as the other two goods. Each  i θ  is also 
constrained to lie between zero and one, and the four shares have a unit sum. The most likely value 
for φ is -0.5, its CV is specified to be 25% and is restricted to be negative. As there is considerable 
more uncertainty regarding the value of ρ, we take its coefficient of variation to be 50%, while its 
mode is -0.5 and its value is restricted to the interval (-1, 0). The above information is recorded in 
rows 5-10 of Table 4. Finally, the Frisch matrix ν is restricted to be negative definite, and the 
distributions for its elements are derived from the above, as indicated in the bottom part of Table 4.  
To simulate the uncertainty of the data and parameters, we draw 5,000 independent sets of 
repeated realisations from the eight distributions specified above. These eight comprise three for 
i w  (the fourth is determined by 
4
i i1w1 = = ∑ ), three for  i θ  (the fourth is again given by 
4
i i1 1 = θ = ∑ ), 
one for φ and one for ρ. If any of the constraints of Table 4 are violated, the draw is discarded. 
The procedure is repeated until there are 5,000 sets of draws that satisfy all the constraints. We then 
estimate the implied subjective probability distributions for all elasticities using frequency 
distributions. For example, in Figure 2, the estimated probability density functions are plotted for 
the four Marshallian price elasticities for marijuana, as well as the income elasticity for this good. 
As can be seen, these distributions display varying degrees of asymmetry. The estimated means, 
standard deviations, and the 95% probability intervals for all elasticities are given in Table 5. In all 
cases, the dispersion is larger for the marijuana rows, reflecting the greater uncertainties associated 
with this product.  
 
5. SIMULATING  POLICY  CHANGES 
 
We consider three examples in this section to illustrate the application of our approach to 
policy issues. As this analysis is intended to be illustrative, we abstract from the supply side by 
assuming infinitely elastic supply schedules, so that all price and tax changes are fully passed onto 
consumers. Table 6 gives the basic information on pre-existing taxation and consumption in 
Australia that will be used subsequently. As can be seen, tax accounts for about 54% of the 
consumer price for tobacco and 41% for alcohol.   15
A Fall in the Marijuana Price 
Suppose marijuana prices were to fall by 10% due to productivity enhancement and/or a 
reduced policing effort.
9 When money income remains unchanged, the change in consumption of 
good i as a result of a change in the price of good j is given by 
(5.1)                       ii j j d(logq ) d(logp ) ′ = η , 
where  ij ′ η  is the (i, j)
th Marshallian price elasticity.
10 To implement this for a 10% fall in marijuana 
price, we set j = 1 and  1 d(logp ) 0.1 =−  to estimate the changes in consumption of marijuana, 
alcohol and tobacco (i = 1, 2 and 3). Allowing for the uncertainty involved in  i1 ′ η , we use the 
previous 5,000 simulated values of this elasticity to generate 5,000 values of  i d(logq ). In the 
column 2 of Panel A in Table 7, we present the means, standard deviations and the 95% probability 
intervals for the relative quantity changes for the three goods. As indicated by the 95% probability 
intervals, there is considerable uncertainty in these quantity changes. 
What happens to revenue from taxation as a result of the fall in the price of marijuana? 
Although there is no direct effect as marijuana escapes the tax net, there are indirect effects on 
tobacco and alcohol taxes. Because marijuana and tobacco are complements, the fall in the price of 
marijuana stimulates tobacco consumption and thus raises its tax revenue. Offsetting this is the 
reduced tax revenue from alcohol, the consumption of which falls as it is a substitute for marijuana. 
Assuming both prices and tax rates are unchanged for the two legal goods, the relative changes in 
tax revenue are equal to the relative changes in quantity, or  ii d(logR ) d(logq ) = , where  i R  denotes 
the tax revenue for good i  (i 2,3) = . Results for the relative tax revenue changes are given in 
column 2 of Panel B of Table 7. Using the base tax revenues given in Table 6 and the Australian 
population of 15 million (aged 14 years and over), these translate into an average annual tax 
revenue change of $87 million for tobacco and −$43 million for alcohol, resulting in a net tax 
increase of $44 million. The means, standard deviations and 95% probability intervals for these 
revenue changes are given in column 2 of Panel C of Table 7. Accounting for all uncertainty 
involved in both data and elasticities, the 95% probability interval for the change in total tax 
revenue is $7 to $105 million, which is obviously rather wide and reflects the genuine uncertainty 
surrounding marijuana.  
                                                 
9 Over the 1990s, the relative price of marijuana fell in Australia by about 40% (Clements, 2004). 
10 The same analysis could also be carried out using Slutsky price elasticities assuming real income constant. However, 
it is probably more realistic to assume money income constant for the policy scenarios considered in this section.   16
An Increase in Tobacco and Alcohol Taxes 
Next, consider the effect of a 10-percentage-point increase in the taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol, which, for simplicity, we take to be ad valorem taxes. For tobacco (alcohol), the tax of 
54% (41%) of consumer prices implies a tax of 119% (69%) of pre-tax prices, so that a 10-
percentage-point increase in the latter rate brings it to 129% (79%). This increase amounts to a 
4.6% (5.9%) relative change in the retail price of tobacco (alcohol).
11 Using equation (5.1) with 
2 d(logp ) 0.046 =  and  3 d(logp ) 0.059 =  separately, we can estimate the resulting relative changes 
in the quantities demanded for all three goods. Again accounting for the uncertainty in the data and 
demand elasticities involved, we use the 5,000 sets of elasticities to compute 5,000 sets of relative 
quantity changes. The means, standard deviations, as well as 95% probability intervals are 
presented in columns 3 and 4 of Panel A in Table 7. For example, the 10-percentage-point rise in 
the alcohol tax rate is estimated to decrease alcohol consumption by 4.1% on average, but to 
increase marijuana and tobacco consumption by 0.91% and 0.93%, respectively. 
The change in taxation revenue from good i is  iii d(logR ) d(logt ) d(logq ) ′ = + , where  i t′ is 
the tax as a proportion of the pre-tax price. For the 10-percentage-point increase in the tobacco tax 
rate, we have  () 22 2 d logt dt t 0.11.19 ′′ ′ =≈ , so that  ( ) () 22 2 d logR 0.1 1.19 0.046 ′ =+ η  is the direct 
revenue change, and  () ( ) 33 2 d logR 0.046 ′ =η  is the indirect effect on account of the impact of the 
higher tobacco price on drinking. Similarly, for the 10-percentage-point rise in the alcohol tax rate, 
() ( ) 22 3 d logR 0.059 ′ =η  and  () ( ) 33 3 d logR 0.1 0.69 0.059 ′ =+ η . The means, standard deviations 
and the 95% probability intervals for the annual tax revenue changes (in relative and dollar terms) 
are given in columns 3 and 4 of Panels B and C of Table 7. For example, the increase in the alcohol 
tax causes the annual alcohol tax revenue to increase by $551 million on average, and tobacco tax 
revenue increases by around $45 million, resulting on average a total annual tax increase of $596 
million. The 95% probability interval for this total increase is $458 $693 − million, which is 
moderately wide but still not huge. 
As the base tax rates for tobacco and alcohol differ, the 10-percentage-point increase implies 
a differential change in the tax rates. The two tax increases can be put on a more equal footing by 
                                                 
11 Let 
ii i i i p , p , q , t , and t ′′ be the retail price, pre-tax price, quantity consumed, tax as a proportion of the retail price, 
and tax as a proportion of the pre-tax price for good i, respectively. The two sets of prices are linked according to 
() ii i p1 t p ′′ =+ , so that  ( )( ) ii i dl o g p d t 1 t ′′ =+ . Thus with 
i dt 0.1 ′ = ,
2 t1 . 1 9 ′ = and 
3 t0 . 6 9 ′ =  and for simplicity 
holding retail margins and GST unchanged, the relative change in the retail price of tobacco is  () 0.1 1+1.19 = 0.046 , 
while that for alcohol is  ( ) 0.1 1+0.69 = 0.059 .   17
increasing each of the rates by 10%, and columns 5-6 of Table 7 contain the results. The major 
difference from before is that now the mean increase in total taxation revenue from tobacco is 
approximately the same as that for alcohol at about 4%, as can be seen from row 6 of columns 5 and 
6. 
Taxing Marijuana – The Revenue-Maximising Rate and a Tax Tradeoff 
Suppose marijuana were legalised and its consumption taxed. The legalisation of marijuana 
itself could shift its supply and demand curves and lead to a reshuffling of the vice budget; for an 
analysis of these issues, see Clements and Daryal (2005) and Clements et al. (2005). But to keep 
things as simple as possible, we shall ignore these “legalisation effects” on production and 
consumption and focus on the opportunities to tax marijuana and its implications. We commence 
with an investigation of the likely revenue available from taxing marijuana, and then proceed to 
consider the implications of redistributing the additional revenue to vice consumers in the form of 
lower alcohol taxes. Again, it is to be emphasised that the analysis is only illustrative of the 
capabilities of the approach. 
We consider two situations denoted by  0 and 1 τ =τ =  for before and after the change in 




= =∑ , where 
() () ()
ii i i Rt p q
τττ ′′ =  is tax revenue from good i in τ, 
()
i t
τ ′  is the tax rate on i in τ ,  i p′ its pre-tax price 
(assumed to be constant throughout), and 
()
i q
τ  is the corresponding quantity. A Marshallian demand 
system in relative change form is given by 
3
j1 ii j j d(logq ) d(logp ) = ∑ ′ =η , and this can be used to 
estimate the effects of any exogenous tax changes via the resulting price changes 
() () ( )
(1) (0) (0)
jj j i dl o g p t t 1 t ′′ ′ =− + under the assumption of infinitely elastic supply.
12  It follows that 
consumption of good i after the tax changes can be expressed as   
(5.2)                                          
(1) (0) 3
jj (1) (0)
ii i j (0)
j1 j
tt
qq e x p .
1t =
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ′′ −
′ =η ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ′ + ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
∑  
As marijuana is initially untaxed, 
(0)
1 t0 ′ = , and we impose a tax on it at rate 
(1)
1 t′ , while 
holding the pre-existing rates on tobacco and alcohol constant, so that 
(1) (0)
jj tt , j 2 , 3 ′′ == . Equation 
(5.2) then defines the new quantities consumed, and we use various values of the marijuana tax rate 
                                                 
12 The basis for the last equation is the definition of the consumer price of good j,  ()
jj j p1 t p ′′ =+ , so that 
() ( )
jj j dl o g p d t 1 t . ′′ =+  We then interpret  j dt′  as 
(1) (0)
jj tt ′ ′ −  and 
j 1t ′ +  as 
(0)
j 1t ′ + .   18
to evaluate tax revenue with the 5,000 sets of the elasticities. As can be seen from Table 8, the tax 
yields a nontrivial amount of revenue; for example, a 30% rate yields a mean of about $85 per 
capita p. a. on average, which represents additional revenue of about one quarter of the pre-existing 
revenue from tobacco. But as tobacco is a complement for marijuana, increasing the tax on the 
latter causes tobacco revenue to fall, as shown by column 3 of Table 8. The 30% marijuana tax 
causes proceeds from tobacco to fall from $324 to $302 on average, a reduction of about 7%. 
Substitutability with alcohol causes alcohol revenue to rise with the marijuana tax, but as can be 
seen from column 4 of Table 8, this rise is quite modest at about 3% for a 30% marijuana tax. The 
net effect of these changes on total receipts from vice taxation is given in column 5, which for a 
30% marijuana tax rises from $684 to a mean of $759, or about 11%.
13 There are two noticeable 
patterns in the dispersion of revenue. Relative to mean revenue, the standard deviations all rise with 
the marijuana tax rate, and the marijuana standard deviations are all substantially larger than those 
of tobacco and alcohol. This reflects the greater uncertainty of the impacts of a tax regime that is 
more distant from the pre-existing one, as well as the greater uncertainty of the underlying data and 
parameters pertaining to marijuana. Figure 3 plots mean revenue against the marijuana tax rate and 
as it has a (gentle) inverted U-shape, it could be described as a type of “Laffer curve”. As can be 
seen, the revenue-maximising tax rate is in the vicinity of 50%.
14 As shown in Table 8, at this 
revenue-maximising rate, marijuana generates around $102 per capita on average, which represents 
an increment of about 15% of existing tax revenue from tobacco and alcohol. Panel B of Figure 3 
illustrates the underlying uncertainty of the tax revenues by presenting a type of “fan chart” (Britton 
                                                 
13 The issue of estimating possible revenues from taxing marijuana in a legalised environment has been considered 
previously in several other studies (Bates, 2004, Caputo and Ostrom, 1994, Easton, 2004, Miron, 2005, and Schwer et 
al., 2002). In what seems to be the most widely-cited paper in this area, Caputo and Ostrom (1994) estimate that for the 
US it would be possible to raise $US3-5 billion from marijuana taxation in 1991. This estimate is based on conservative 
assumptions regarding the continued existence after legalisation of a black market that avoided the tax. For comparison, 
in the same year tax revenue from tobacco and alcohol combined was $22b (roughly evenly split between tobacco and 
alcohol).  Using the mid-point of the above range of $4b, the marijuana tax would thus represent an addition of about 
18% to revenue from vice taxation. As shown in the sixth row of column 2 of our Table 8 (corresponding to a marijuana 
tax of 50%), we estimate that the maximum revenue from taxing marijuana in Australia is about $A102 per capita, or 
about 102/684 ≈ 15% of pre-existing revenue from vice. Accordingly, our estimates seem to be in broad agreement with 
those of Caputo and Ostrom (1994). In a more recent US study, Miron (2005) estimates that marijuana could generate 
about $US2b p.a. if taxed at the same rate as other goods, or $6b if taxed at a rate comparable to that on tobacco and 
alcohol. Miron argues that these figures are similar to the earlier revenue estimates of Caputo and Ostrom (1994).  
14 Revenue from marijuana is  ( )
(1) (1) (0) (1)
11 1 1 1 1 1 Rt p q e x p t ′′ ′ ′ =η , so that the first-order condition for a maximum is 
( ) ( )
(1) (0) (1)
11 1 1 1 11 1
(1) (1)
11 R 1t p q e x p t 0 t ∂∂ ′′ ′ ′′ =+ η η = ′ . Accordingly, the revenue-maximising tax is 
(1)*
11 1 t1 / ′′ =− η . The 
corresponding tax as a proportion of the consumer price is  ( ) ( )
(1)* (1)* (1)*
11 1 1 1 tt1 t 1 1 ′ ′′ = += − η . Using the mean elasticity 
of   11 0.67 ′ η= − , gives 
(1)*
1 t0 . 6 = . In view of the approximation involved in using means (ignoring Jensen’s inequality), 
this value is in reasonable agreement with the revenue-maximising rate of Figure 3.   19
et al., 1998, Wallis, 1999) in which the darker colours denote values that have a higher probability 
of occurrence. This shows clearly how revenue uncertainty increases with the marijuana tax rate. 
Next, we analyse the implications of the additional revenue by considering an offsetting 
reduction in alcohol taxes that serves to keep constant total tax collections from vice. That is, we 
shall keep tobacco taxes unchanged and consider a revenue-neutral reduction in alcohol taxes 
associated with the new tax on marijuana, so that the marijuana tax dividend is given to drinkers in 
the form of lower taxes. Our problem is to specify the marijuana tax rate at some fixed value, say 
(1)
11 ˆ tt ′′ = , and to solve for the revenue-neutral reduction in alcohol taxes. More formally, the 
problem is to find the new tax on alcohol, 
(1)
3 t′ , that satisfies the following conditions: 
(i)  
(0)
1 t0 ′ =     [Marijuana is initially tax free], 
(ii) 
(1)
11 ˆ tt ′′ =     [Marijuana is now taxed at rate  1 ˆ t′ ], 
(iii) 
(1) (0)
22 tt ′′ =    [Tobacco continues to be taxed at the same rate], and  
(iv)  
(1) (0) RR =   [Total tax revenue is unchanged] . 
  Details of the numerical solution to the above problem are contained in Clements et al. 
(2005). Panel A of Figure 4 gives this tradeoff by averaging over the 5,000 trials as before. As can 
be seen, the tradeoff is negatively-sloped for marijuana tax rates of up to the revenue-maximising 
rate of about 50%, but since the curve tends to get flatter as the marijuana tax increases, the tradeoff 
worsens as we move down the curve. This is due to two reasons. (1) Because the higher marijuana 
tax causes its consumption (the tax base) to be lower, a further increase in the rate generates a 
smaller increment to revenue, allowing only a smaller reduction of alcohol taxes. (2) As it is a 
substitute for marijuana, alcohol consumption rises with a higher marijuana tax, so that the 
reduction in the alcohol tax rate required to just absorb the additional revenue from marijuana is 
smaller, which contributes to the flattening out of the curve.
15 When the marijuana tax exceeds the 
revenue-maximising rate, the tradeoff becomes positively sloped. The slope of the tradeoff is given 
in Panel B of Figure 4. This reveals that for a marijuana tax of 20% for example, the tradeoff is 
approximately 1:2, so that a two-percentage-point increase in the marijuana tax is associated with 
almost a one-percentage-point reduction in the alcohol tax. This reflects primarily the differences in 
                                                 
15 It is to be noted that along the tradeoff not only does consumption of alcohol and marijuana change, but so also does 
that of tobacco. As tobacco and marijuana are complements, an increase in the marijuana tax lowers tobacco 
consumption and taxation revenue from this good; and because tobacco and alcohol are substitutes, a lowering of the 
alcohol tax also leads to reduced revenue from tobacco.  Accordingly, as we move down the tradeoff, for a marijuana 
tax of less than 50%, revenue from taxing tobacco falls unambiguously. By construction, along the tradeoff these 
changes in revenue from tobacco are “neutralised” by offsetting changes in the alcohol tax which serve to keep overall 
taxation revenue constant.   20
the tax bases of the two goods, and to a lesser extent, differences in their price elasticities. But as 
the marijuana tax increases from 20% to, say, 30%, the slope of the curve (in absolute value) falls, 
from 0.46 to 0.41. 
As the tradeoff of Figure 4 is the mean over the 5,000 trials, it represents the centre-of-
gravity effects. But to understand the underlying uncertainty of these effects, we need to examine 
other aspects of the simulation results, such as the frequencies given in Figure 5. These show that 
the nature of the tradeoff is reasonably well defined for low rates of marijuana taxation, but 
uncertainty increases with the tax rate. This, of course, is to be expected as increased marijuana 
taxation involves a move away from its current tax-free status to something that has not been 
previously observed. Finally, we consider the distribution of the alcohol tax conditional on the 
marijuana tax by analysing cross sections of the “vice mountain” of Figure 5. The left-hand side of 
Panel A of Figure 6 presents the conditional distribution when marijuana is taxed at 10%. As can be 
seen, the mean alcohol tax is about 35%, while the standard deviation of the 5,000 trials is 1 
percentage point. As the marijuana tax is increased to 20 and 30%, the mean alcohol tax falls to 30 
and 26%, respectively, and the standard deviation rises to 1.6 and 2.7 percentage points, as shown 
in Panels B and C of the figure. The increased dispersion of the distribution clearly reflects the 
greater uncertainty of the alcohol tax as we move further away from the status quo of not taxing 
marijuana. This phenomenon is also reflected in the conditional distributions of the slope of the 
tradeoff, given on the right-hand side of Figure 6. 
 
6. CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
 
This paper has considered the generic problem of how to analyse the demand for a product 
for which there is limited information available in the form of hard data and its price 
responsiveness. We introduced procedures that (i) draw on the interactions in consumption of the 
product with others, and (ii) organise whatever information there is available in the form of 
subjective probability distributions. We applied these procedures to the demand for marijuana, a 
product for which there exists no official data, and only fragmentary evidence on its price 
responsiveness, mainly based on survey information. But as marijuana consumption is known to be 
related to tobacco and alcohol usage, we were able to exploit some of this prior knowledge by using 
a system-wide demand model that considers all three goods simultaneously. To organise this 
knowledge efficiently, we started with a differential demand system that has strong links with the 
structure of the consumer’s preferences, and then proceeded to derive the associated price   21
elasticites. As the utility-based parameters of the demand system are random, reflecting the 
uncertainty regarding their true values, the price elasitcities have probability distributions, which we 
obtained via Monte Carlo simulations. In other situations where little data are available, our 
procedures could also be useful. For example, they could be used to analyse the determinants of the 
consumption of other illicit goods, new goods, or goods that have been substantially 
“reconfigured”. 
To illustrate some applications of the approach, we used Australian data to carry out several 
price/tax simulations. For example, we considered the hypothetical legalisation of the consumption 
of marijuana, which was then subject to taxation. The tax has the effect of inhibiting marijuana 
usage, stimulating drinking (as alcoholic beverages are a substitute for marijuana) and reducing the 
smoking of tobacco (a complement for marijuana). The net effect is for revenue from vice taxation 
to increase with the marijuana tax up until the rate hits about 50% of consumer prices (or about 
100% of producer prices). We estimate that the maximum revenue attainable from taxing marijuana 
is equivalent to about 15% of pre-existing revenue from tobacco and alcohol. Next, we analysed the 
reduction in alcohol taxes if the marijuana tax dividend were used in a revenue-neutral tax tradeoff. 
For modest rates of marijuana taxation, this resulted in a rough rule of one-half; for each 
percentage-point increase in the marijuana tax, alcohol taxation could be reduced by about one-half 
of a percentage point. For higher marijuana tax rates, as marijuana consumption falls and drinking 
increases, the tradeoff worsens and successive increases in the marijuana tax allow only smaller and 
smaller reductions in alcohol taxes. The attractive feature of our approach is that it provides the 
whole distribution of the alcohol tax corresponding to each rate of marijuana taxation. The 
dispersion of this distribution, which reflects the underlying uncertainty concerning data and 
parameters, increases as we move away from the status quo whereby marijuana escapes the tax net, 
and subject it to successively higher rates of taxation.   22
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TABLE 1 
 
BASELINE DATA FOR VICE DEMAND 
Commodity 
Budget share 
i w ×100 
Income elasticity 
i η  
Marginal share 
i θ ×100 
     (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
Marijuana  2.0  1.2             2.4 
Tobacco  2.0  0.4             0.8 
Alcohol  4.0  1.0             4.0 
Other  92.0  1.0087               92.8 
Total  100.0                100.0 






PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR MARIJUANA WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICE OF 







.0 -.1 -.2 -.3 -.4 -.5 -.6 -.7 -.8 -.9 -1.0
 
 
Marshallian  12 ′ η  
Degree of complementarity ρ   
Slutsky  12 η
Frisch  
*
12 η  
Cross-price 
elasticity   25
TABLE 2 
FIRST SPECIFICATION OF BASELINE PRICE RESPONSIVENESS OF DEMAND:   0 = ρ  (Preference Independence) 
Good  Marijuana  Tobacco Alcohol Other   Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol Other   Marijuana Tobacco  Alcohol  Other 
       A.  Price Coefficients ν  ( × 10
2)    B.  Inverse of Price Coefficients 
−1 ν  ( × 10
-1 )              C.  Frisch Price Elasticities [
*
ij η ] 
Marijuana  -1.20  0 0  0    -8.33  0 0  0    -.60 0 0  0 
Tobacco 0 -.40 0  0    0  -25 0 0    0  -.20 0  0 
Alcohol 0  0  -2.00  0    0  0 -5  0    0  0  -.50  0 
Other  0 0 0  -46.40    0  0 0  -.22    0  0 0  -.50 
  D.  Slutsky Coefficients  [ πij ] ( × 10
2 )                 E.  Slutsky Price Elasticities  [ ηij ]    F.  Marshallian Price Elasticities [ ij η′ ]   
Marijuana -1.17  .01  .05  1.11    -.586  .005  .024  .557   -.610  -.019  -.024  -.547 
Tobacco .01 -.40 .02  .37    .005 -.198  .008  .186    -.003 -.206  -.008  -.182 
Alcohol .05 .02  -1.92  1.86    .012  .004  -.480  .464    -.008  -.016  -.520  -.456 





SECOND SPECIFICATION OF BASELINE PRICE RESPONSIVENESS OF DEMAND:   5 . − = ρ  (Preference Dependence) 
Good  Marijuana  Tobacco Alcohol Other   Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol Other   Marijuana Tobacco  Alcohol  Other 
  A.  Price Coefficients ν  ( × 10
2)    B.  Inverse of Price Coefficients 
−1 ν  ( × 10
-1 )                    C.  Frisch Price Elasticities [
*
ij η ] 
Marijuana -1.20  -.35  .35  0   -11.12  9.45  -.22  0   -.60  -.17  .17  0 
Tobacco -.35 -.40 .35 0    9.45  -36.16  -3.44 0    -.17  -.20 .17  0 
Alcohol  .35  .35  -2.69 0    -.22  -3.44 -4.18  0   .09  .09  -.67 0 
Other  0 0 0  -46.40    0  0 0  -.22    0  0 0  -.50 
  D.  Slutsky Coefficients  [ πij ] ( × 10
2 )                     E.  Slutsky Price Elasticities  [ ηij ]               F.  Marshallian Price Elasticities [ ij η′ ]    
Marijuana -1.17  -.34  .39  1.11    -.586  -.168  .197  .557   -.610  -.192  .149  -.547 
Tobacco -.34 -.40 .36  .37    -.168 -.198  .181  .186    -.176 -.206  .165  -.182 
Alcohol  .39  .36  -2.61  1.86    .099 .091  -.653  .464    -.079 .071  -.693  -.456 
Other 1.11  .37  1.86  -3.34    .012  .004  .020  -.036    -.008  -.016  -.020  -.964 
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TABLE 4  
 
STOCHASTIC SPECIFICATION OF DATA AND DEMAND COEFFICIENTS 
Variable/ 
parameter 














Budget shares  i w        
1.   Marijuana  .02  .005  .25  (.0114, .0283)  1 w 0 1 < <  
2.   Tobacco  .02  .0025  .125  (.0157, .0242)  1 w 0 2 < <  
3.   Alcohol  .04  .005  .125  (.0316, .0483)  1 w 0 3 < <  
4.   Other  .92  .0075  .008  (.9075, .9333)  1 w 0 4 < < , 
∑ − = =
3
1 i i 4 w 1 w  
      Sum  1.00         
Income flexibility        
5.  φ   -.5  . 125  .25  (-.7384, -.2501)  0 < φ  
Correlation coefficient 
      
6.  ρ -.5  .25  .50  (-0.9150,  -.0843)  0 1 < ρ < −  
Marginal shares  i θ         
7.   Marijuana  .024  .012  .50  (.0038, .0482)  0 1 > θ  
8.   Tobacco  .008  .002  . 25  (.00413, .01197)  0 2 > θ  
9.   Alcohol  .04  .01  . 25  (.0205, .0590)  0 3 > θ  
10. Other  .928  .016  .017  (.8969, .9565)  0 4 > θ ,   
∑ θ − = θ =
3
1 i i 4 1  
      Sum  1.00         
Frisch price coefficient matrix ν       
 
  ν   negative 
definite 














α + θ φ α − α −
α − θ φ α
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FIGURE 2 
SIMULATED DEMAND ELASTICITIES FOR MARIJUANA  
 
A. MARSHALLIAN PRICE ELASTICITIES 
 





















































































Note: Panel A contains the distributions of the price elasticity of demand for marijuana with respect to the price of 
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TABLE 5  
 
SUMMARY OF DEMAND ELASTICITIES 
Price 
Good  Marijuana  Tobacco Alcohol  Other 
  A. Frisch Price Elasticities 
*
ij [] η  
Marijuana  -.66  (.41)  -.18  (.13)  .18  (.13)      0  (0) 
  [-1.71, -.09]  [-.49, -.01]  [.01, .49]  [0, 0] 
Tobacco  -.17  (.10)  -.20  (.08)  .17  (.10)      0  (0) 
  [-.42, -.01]  [-.38, -.08]  [.01, .42]  [0, 0] 
Alcohol  .08 (.05)  .08 (.05)  -.68 (.25)        0 (0) 
  [.01,  .21]  [.01, .21]  [-1.25, -.27]  [0, 0] 
Other     0  (0)     0  (0)     0  (0)  -.50  (.13) 
  [0, 0]  [0, 0]  [0, 0]  [-.75, -.26] 
B. Slutsky Price Elasticities  ij [] η  
Marijuana -.641  (.393)  -.171  (.125)  .203 (.140)  .609 (.373) 
  [-1.633, -.089]  [-.478, -.012]  [.024, .548]  [.084, 1.552] 
Tobacco -.162  (.102)  -.201  (.077)  .175 (.106)  .188 (.072) 
  [-.408, -.012]  [-.377, -.077]  [.020, .431]  [.072, .355] 
Alcohol .096  (.057)  .088  (.053)  -.654 (.240)  .470 (.176) 
  [.013,  .233]  [.010, .213]  [-1.204, -.266]  [.190, .875] 
Other .012  (.006)  .004  (.001)  .020 (.007)  -.037 (.012) 
  [.002,  .027]  [.002, .007]  [.008, .035]  [-.062, -.017] 
C. Marshallian Price Elasticities  ij [] ′ η  
Marijuana  -.665 (.390)  -.195 (.125)  .155 (.140)  -.495 (.371) 
  [-1.651, -.115]  [-.502, -.035]  [-.024, .502]  [-1.020, .438] 
Tobacco  -.170 (.102)  -.209 (.077)  .159 (.106)  -.180 (.072) 
  [-.415, -.019]  [-.385, -.086]  [.004, .415]  [-.295, -.014] 
Alcohol  .076 (.057)  .068 (.053)  -.694 (.238)  -.450 (.175) 
  [-.009,  .212]  [-.010, .193]  [-1.243, -.308]  [-.729, -.049] 
Other  -.008 (.008)  -.016 (.003)  -.020 (.009)  -.964 (.014) 
  [-.023,  .009]  [-.022, -.010]  [-.036, -.002]  [-.993, -.940] 
D. Income Elasticities  i [] η  
  1.323 (.807)  .405 (.115)  1.018 (.292)  1.008 (.019) 
  [.193, 3.120]  [.202, .653]  [.502, 1.613]  [.972, 1.044] 
Note:    The first entry in each cell is the mean over the 5,000 trials.  The second entry, given on the right in 
parentheses, is the associated standard deviation.  The range below the mean and standard deviation is the 
95% probability interval. 
 















1.   Consumption expenditure  









2.  Tax rate  









3.  Tax revenue 










1.  Consumption expenditure is for 1998, from Clements et al.  (2005, Panel A of Table A2). 
2. The tax rate for tobacco is derived from excise and customs revenue published by the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare in Statistics on Drug Use in Australia 2002, Tables 2.5 and 2.6, as well as consumption data 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. No. 5206.0 
3. The tax rate for alcohol is derived from Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005) as follows. In their Table 11.12 
(page 319), the Selvanathans report for Australia the following taxes (as percentages of consumer prices): Beer 
43%, wine 23% and spirits 55%. The corresponding conditional budget shares (×100), from Clements et al. 
(2005, Panel B of Table A1), are 55, 23 and 22 (in the same order). Thus a budget-share weighted average tax 
rate for alcohol as a whole is .55 × 43 + .23 × 23 + .22 × 55 = 41%, as reported in row 2 of column 4 above. 
4. Tax revenue is the product of the corresponding tax rate and consumption expenditure. 
5. Population, used to convert to per capita, refers to those aged 14 years and over. 
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TABLE 7  
SIMULATIONS OF VICE CONSUMPTION AND TAXATION REVENUE 
 
   Exogenous change 
Endogenous 
variable 
10% fall in 
marijuana  
prices 
10-percentage-point increase  
in the tax rate 
10% increase in 
the tax rate 


























































(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
A. Quantity consumed (Logarithmic changes × 100) 
                
1.  Marijuana  7.01  (-4.11)   -0.89   (0.57)  0.91   (0.82)   -1.06    (0.68)   0.64    (0.57)  
  [1.20,  17.39]   [-2.30,   -.16]  [-.14,  2.95]    [-2.73,   -.19]   [-.10,   2.07]    
           
2.  Tobacco  1.79  (1.08)    -0.95  (0.35)   0.93   (0.62)   -1.14    (0.42)   0.65    (0.43)  
 
[.20,    4.37]   [-1.76,   -.39]  [.02,   2.44]     [-2.09,    -.47]  [.02,  1.71]   
           
3.  Alcohol  -0.8   (0.6)    0.31  (0.24)   -4.08  (1.4)    0.37     (0.29)   -2.86  (0.98)  
  [-2.24,   .09]   [-.04,  . 88]    [-7.31,  -1.81]  [-.05,    1.05]   [-5.12,  -1.27]   
 
B. Taxation revenue (Logarithmic changes × 100) 
                    
4.  Tobacco   1.79    (1.08)   7.46    (0.35)   0.93    (0.62)   8.87  (0.42)    0.65   (0.43)  
  [.20,    4.37]   [6.65,  8.02]   [.02,      2.44]   [7.91,    9.54]   [.02,     1.71]  
           
5.  Alcohol  -0.8   (0.6)    0.31   (0.24)   10.2     (1.4)   0.37  (0.29)    7.14   (0.98)  
  [-2.24,    .09]   [-.04,   .88]    [6.98,   12.48]  [-.05,   1.05]   [4.88,  8.73]  
           
6.  Total   0.41    (0.24)   3.67    (0.16)  5.85   (0.6)    4.36   (0.19)    4.09   (0.42)  
  [.07,    1.01]      [3.31,  3.93]   [4.48,   6.79]   [3.93,    4.68]   [3.14,    4.76]    
 
C. Taxation revenue ($m) 
                    
7. Tobacco  87   (52)    362   (17)    45    (30)    431    (20)    32   (21)   
  [10,    212]    [323,  390]    [1,    119]    [385,  464]    [1,      83]   
           
8. Alcohol  -43    (32)    17     (13)    551      (76)    20  (16)    386    (53)   
  [-121,    5]    [-2,      48]    [377,    674]   [-3,    57]    [264,  472]   
           
9. Total  44    (26)    379    (16)    596     (61)    451   (19)    417   (43)   
  [7,    105]      [342,   406]      [458,     693]      [406,  483]    [442,  462]      
                        
Note:  The first entry in each cell is the mean over the 5,000 trials.  The second entry, given on the right 
in parentheses, is the associated standard deviation.  The range below the mean and standard 




REVENUE FROM TAXING MARIJUANA 
 
Tax revenue (dollars per capita)  Marijuana  
tax rate 










0  0 -  324 -  360 -  684  - 
             
10  35 (1)  318 (4)  363 (2)  716 (2) 
  [31, 37]  [310, 323]  [360 369]  [710, 720] 
          
20  63 (6)  311 (8)  367 (5)  741 (7) 
  [49, 72]  [292, 323]  [360, 380]  [724, 753] 
          
30  85 (13)  302 (13)  372 (9)  759 (15) 
  [55, 106]  [271, 322]  [359, 395]  [725, 783] 
          
40  98 (22)  290 (19)  (379) (15)  768 (24) 
  [50, 138]  [246, 320]  [358, 415]  [715, 811] 
          
50  102 (33)  275 (27)  390 (23)  767 (34) 
  [36, 166]  [214, 318]  [357, 446]  [699, 833] 
          
60  94 (44)  254 (37)  405 (36)  754 (43) 
  [19, 188]  [174, 315]  [356, 495]  [680, 846] 
          
70  75 (51)  224 (49)  434 (62)  733 (48) 
  [6, 199]  [123, 310]  [353, 591]  [662, 850] 
Note: The first entry in each cell is the mean over the 5,000 trials.  The second entry, given on the right in 
parentheses, is the associated standard deviation.  The range below the mean and standard deviation is 
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FIGURE 3 
THE MARIJUANA LAFFER CURVE 
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Note:  Panel A plots the means over the 5,000 trials. In Panel B, the boundaries of the fan chart are the 10, 20, …, 90 
percentiles of the distribution of tax revenues from the simulation, so that the solid lines are the medians, instead 
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FIGURE 4 
THE ALCOHOL-MARIJUANA TAX TRADEOFF 
(Means over 5,000 trials) 
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FIGURE 5 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE TRADEOFF  
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FIGURE 6 
CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOL TAX AND SLOPE OF TRADEOFF 
 
Alcohol tax rate × 100  Slope of tradeoff × 100 
  












































































































































































































Mean = -46.2 
SD = 10.9
Mean = 26.1 
SD = 2.7 
Mean = -41.1
SD = 16.8
Mean = 35.1 
SD = 1.0 
Mean = -52.7 
SD = 6.9
Mean = 30.3 
SD = 1.6 